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Title: Adverse selection and corporate governance
Authors: Charlie Charoenwong
David K. Ding
Vasan Siraprapasiri
Nanyang Technological University
Massey University, Auckland
Singapore Management University
Mahidol University
Keywords: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Issue Date: 1-Jun-2011
Citation: International Review of Economics and Finance. Vol.20, No.3 (2011), 406-420
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of stocks listed on the Singapore Exchange. These companies have been identified by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) with the highest level of corporate governance among 25 emerging markets. We measure corporate governance by several criteria: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The results show that corporate governance has an inverse relationship with adverse selection. However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection. In addition, Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are shown to have a smaller adverse selection component than non-GLCs. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.
ISSN: 10590560
Appears in Collections:Scopus 2011-2015

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