P. JirapornP. ChintrakarnPennsylvania State UniversityThammasat UniversityMahidol UniversityThailand National Institute of Development Administration2018-10-192018-10-192013-05-31Applied Economics Letters. Vol.20, No.11 (2013), 1036-103914664291135048512-s2.0-84878257154https://repository.li.mahidol.ac.th/handle/20.500.14594/31704'Lucky' CEOs are given stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing, severe agency problems and poor corporate governance. We find that lucky (opportunistic) CEOs invest significantly less in CSR. The evidence thus does not support the notion that CSR is primarily used to enhance managers' private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Rather, lucky CEOs appear to view CSR investments as depriving them of the free cash flow they could otherwise exploit. © 2013 Taylor & Francis.Mahidol UniversityEconomics, Econometrics and FinanceArticleSCOPUS10.1080/13504851.2013.772291