Pandej ChintrakarnPornsit JirapornNapatsorn JirapornMahidol UniversityPennsylvania State UniversityState University of New York (SUNY) at New PaltzThailand National Institute of Development Administration2018-11-092018-11-092014-01-01Finance Research Letters. Vol.11, No.3 (2014), 289-294154461232-s2.0-84907280551https://repository.li.mahidol.ac.th/handle/123456789/33803© 2013 Elsevier Inc. CEOs are “lucky“ when they are granted stock options on days when the stock price is lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing and severe agency problems (Bebchuk et al., 2010). Using idiosyncratic volatility as our measure of stock price informativeness, we find that lucky CEOs improve the informativeness of stock prices significantly. In particular, CEO luck raises the degree of informativeness by 4.39%. Powerful CEOs who can circumvent governance mechanisms and successfully practice opportunistic timing of options grants are so secured in their positions that they have fewer incentives to conceal information, thereby improving informativeness.Mahidol UniversityEconomics, Econometrics and FinanceArticleSCOPUS10.1016/j.frl.2013.11.006