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Delaware incorporation and the coard of directors.

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dc.contributor.authorPornsit Jirapornen_US
dc.contributor.authorWallace N Davidson IIIen_US
dc.contributor.authorPandej Chintrakarnen_US
dc.contributor.otherMahidol University. International College.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-01T10:57:26Z
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-08T08:23:37Z
dc.date.available2015-07-01T10:57:26Z
dc.date.available2018-03-08T08:23:37Z
dc.date.created2015
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description.abstractThis study investigates the impact of Delaware law on the composition and size of the board of directors. Our empirical evidence reveals that Delaware firms have smaller and more independent boards than their non-Delaware counterparts. Given that we find no value-premium for firms that incorporate in Delaware, we interpret our findings as consistent with Delaware law benefiting managers. The more shareholder-friendly boards in Delaware exist to offset the benefits that managers derive from Delaware incorporation.en_US
dc.identifier.citationQuarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting. Vol.48, No.3 (2009), 41-60en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.li.mahidol.ac.th/handle/20.500.14594/9962
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsMahidol Universityen_US
dc.subjectDelaware incorporationen_US
dc.subjectCoarden_US
dc.subjectDirectorsen_US
dc.titleDelaware incorporation and the coard of directors.en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication

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