Publication:
How do powerful CEOs view dividends and stock repurchases? Evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)

dc.contributor.authorPandej Chintrakarnen_US
dc.contributor.authorPattanaporn Chatjuthamarden_US
dc.contributor.authorShenghui Tongen_US
dc.contributor.authorPornsit Jirapornen_US
dc.contributor.otherChulalongkorn Universityen_US
dc.contributor.otherMahidol Universityen_US
dc.contributor.otherSiena Collegeen_US
dc.contributor.otherPennsylvania State Universityen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-23T11:03:06Z
dc.date.available2019-08-23T11:03:06Z
dc.date.issued2018-11-01en_US
dc.description.abstract© 2018 Elsevier Inc. Agency theory suggests that CEOs view dividends unfavorably because dividend payouts deprive them of the free cash flow they could otherwise exploit. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to measure CEO power, we find that an increase in CEO power by one standard deviation decreases the probability of paying dividends by 17.48%. For dividend-paying firms, a rise in CEO power by one standard deviation reduces the size of dividend payouts by 5.91%. Share repurchases, however, are not influenced by CEO power, although they too take away the free cash flow from the CEO.en_US
dc.identifier.citationInternational Review of Economics and Finance. Vol.58, (2018), 49-64en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.iref.2018.02.023en_US
dc.identifier.issn10590560en_US
dc.identifier.other2-s2.0-85043240477en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.li.mahidol.ac.th/handle/20.500.14594/45756
dc.rightsMahidol Universityen_US
dc.rights.holderSCOPUSen_US
dc.source.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85043240477&origin=inwarden_US
dc.subjectEconomics, Econometrics and Financeen_US
dc.titleHow do powerful CEOs view dividends and stock repurchases? Evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
mu.datasource.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=85043240477&origin=inwarden_US

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