Faking photon number on a transition-edge sensor
Issued Date
2022-12-01
Resource Type
eISSN
21960763
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-85137602140
Journal Title
EPJ Quantum Technology
Volume
9
Issue
1
Rights Holder(s)
SCOPUS
Bibliographic Citation
EPJ Quantum Technology Vol.9 No.1 (2022)
Suggested Citation
Chaiwongkhot P., Zhong J., Huang A., Qin H., Shi S.c., Makarov V. Faking photon number on a transition-edge sensor. EPJ Quantum Technology Vol.9 No.1 (2022). doi:10.1140/epjqt/s40507-022-00141-2 Retrieved from: https://repository.li.mahidol.ac.th/handle/20.500.14594/86907
Title
Faking photon number on a transition-edge sensor
Author(s)
Author's Affiliation
Centre for Quantum Technologies
National University of Science & Technology (MISIS)
National University of Defense Technology China
University of Science and Technology of China
University of Waterloo
Mahidol University
Purple Mountain Observatory Chinese Academy of Sciences
Quantum Technology Foundation (Thailand)
National University of Science & Technology (MISIS)
National University of Defense Technology China
University of Science and Technology of China
University of Waterloo
Mahidol University
Purple Mountain Observatory Chinese Academy of Sciences
Quantum Technology Foundation (Thailand)
Other Contributor(s)
Abstract
We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In one experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending a larger number of photons at a longer wavelength, which is an expected and known behaviour. In another experiment, we unexpectedly find that the detector can be blinded by bright continuous-wave light and then, a controlled response simulating single-photon detection can be produced by applying a bright light pulse. We model an intercept-and-resend attack on a quantum key distribution system that exploits the latter vulnerability and, under certain assumptions, able to steal the key.