Tax avoidance, managerial ownership, and agency conflicts
Issued Date
2024-03-01
Resource Type
ISSN
15446123
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-85183418581
Journal Title
Finance Research Letters
Volume
61
Rights Holder(s)
SCOPUS
Bibliographic Citation
Finance Research Letters Vol.61 (2024)
Suggested Citation
Wongsinhirun N., Chatjuthamard P., Chintrakarn P., Jiraporn P. Tax avoidance, managerial ownership, and agency conflicts. Finance Research Letters Vol.61 (2024). doi:10.1016/j.frl.2023.104937 Retrieved from: https://repository.li.mahidol.ac.th/handle/20.500.14594/97377
Title
Tax avoidance, managerial ownership, and agency conflicts
Author's Affiliation
Corresponding Author(s)
Other Contributor(s)
Abstract
We examine how corporate tax avoidance is influenced by managerial ownership. Our results, based on a large sample of nearly 30,000 observations across a quarter of a century, demonstrate that firms where managers hold more shares exhibit less tax avoidance. Our findings corroborate the notion that corporate tax avoidance is primarily motivated by agency conflicts and is significantly mitigated by higher managerial ownership, which brings managers and shareholders’ interests into better alignment. Further analysis corroborates the results, i.e., propensity score matching, an instrumental variable analysis, and using alternative measures of tax avoidance.