Strengthening or Weakening Political Parties? Party Financing in Thailand after the 2014 Military Coup

Abstract

Thailand’s Political Party Development Fund (PPDF) was created in 1998 to provide state subsidies to political parties. Primarily designed to reduce the influence of business conglomerates over parties by providing subvention from the state and to support their development by requiring them to establish local branches and recruit members, unintentionally it has also encouraged small and new parties to maximize their funding by creating inactive branches and registering fake members. In the wake of the 2014 military coup, the junta-appointed drafters of a new Constitution (promulgated in 2017) attempted to solve those problems through new regulations that allowed the state to control and limit parties’ freedom over financial management. This article examines these new laws. It finds that they have failed to curb corrupt practices among small parties while creating new obstacles for parties when trying to abide by the onerous reporting and compliance requirements. Thus, the new regulations have not promoted party development and are counterproductive for established parties.