Locke’s Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities as Partly Correlated with Kant’s Account of The Thing in Itself
Issued Date
2023-04-21
Resource Type
ISSN
08599920
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-85176742028
Journal Title
Manusya
Volume
26
Rights Holder(s)
SCOPUS
Bibliographic Citation
Manusya Vol.26 (2023)
Suggested Citation
Oungkanungveth P. Locke’s Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities as Partly Correlated with Kant’s Account of The Thing in Itself. Manusya Vol.26 (2023). doi:10.1163/26659077-26010006 Retrieved from: https://repository.li.mahidol.ac.th/handle/20.500.14594/91145
Title
Locke’s Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities as Partly Correlated with Kant’s Account of The Thing in Itself
Author(s)
Author's Affiliation
Other Contributor(s)
Abstract
In this research, I propose intertwined arguments regarding John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Firstly, I will show how Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities causes several problems of perception. Secondly, I demonstrate how such problems affect how we might see this distinction in a way that partially supports Kant’s concept of the thing in itself. To begin, I provide a brief history of the topic before delving into Locke’s description of empiricism and interpreting his writing on primary and secondary qualities. Next, I discuss the problem of primary qualities, considering the interpretation of solidity and Locke’s resemblance thesis. The analysis in the last section demonstrates how inconsistency with the respect to ideas of power and sensation lead us to believe that Locke’s account generates Kant’s account of the thing in itself.