CSR inequality, managerial myopia and hostile takeover threats
Issued Date
2024-01-01
Resource Type
ISSN
03074358
eISSN
17587743
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-85184153474
Journal Title
Managerial Finance
Rights Holder(s)
SCOPUS
Bibliographic Citation
Managerial Finance (2024)
Suggested Citation
Chatjuthamard P., Chintrakarn P., Jiraporn P., Kitiwong W., Chaivisuttangkun S. CSR inequality, managerial myopia and hostile takeover threats. Managerial Finance (2024). doi:10.1108/MF-07-2023-0429 Retrieved from: https://repository.li.mahidol.ac.th/handle/123456789/97186
Title
CSR inequality, managerial myopia and hostile takeover threats
Corresponding Author(s)
Other Contributor(s)
Abstract
Purpose: Exploiting a novel measure of hostile takeover exposure primarily based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, we explore a crucial, albeit largely overlooked, aspect of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, we investigate CSR inequality, which is the inequality across different CSR categories. Higher inequality suggests a less balanced, more lopsided, CSR policy. Design/methodology/approach: In addition to the standard regression analysis, we perform several robustness checks including propensity score matching, entropy balancing and an instrumental-variable analysis. Findings: Our results show that more takeover exposure exacerbates CSR inequality. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in an increase in CSR inequality by 4.53–5.40%. The findings support the managerial myopia hypothesis, where myopic managers promote some CSR activities that are useful to them in the short run more than others, leading to higher CSR inequality. Originality/value: Our study is the first to exploit a unique measure of takeover vulnerability to investigate the impact of takeover threats on CSR inequality, which is an important aspect of CSR that is largely overlooked in the literature. We aptly fill this void in the literature.